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Summary
Outsourcing of non-core activities is nowadays a common business strategy. Declining transaction
and transportation costs caused by the advent of Information and Communication Technology are a
potentially important driving force behind this development. This paper provides a theoretical frame-
work for analysing a firm’s incentive to follow such a strategy of outsourcing and its consequences
for macroeconomic variables like growth and product variety. We divide production activities into
core and non-core activities. Non-core activities can be performed within the firm or can be mediated
by the market. We derive conditions under which outsourcing occurs, and under which outsourcing is
socially desirable. These conditions do not necessarily coincide. Outsourcing may hence be a profit-
able strategy for firms, while it is socially suboptimal. Crucial parameters in the model are the rela-
tive scale of core versus non-core activities, management costs, transaction costs and love for variety
of consumers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing of activities to the service sector is nowadays a common business
strategy. According to Abraham ~1990! and Abraham and Taylor ~1993!, market
mediated work arrangements associated with business service employment in-
creased substantially over the period 1975-1990. For a longer period, Ten Raa
and Wolff ~2000! find a gradual increase in the share of total service inputs in
gross output in both constant and current dollars in the period 1947-1996, with
an acceleration during the 1980s. In current dollars, the ratio increased from 9.6%
in 1947 to 18.4% in 1996, while in constant dollars it increased from 12% in
1947 to 18.4% in 1996. This evidence is suggestive for the importance of out-
sourcing. Part of the process of deindustrialization can be associated with this
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development of ‘splintering’ ~e.g., Bhagwati ~1984! and Postner ~1990!!. Activi-
ties previously performed within a manufacturing firm ~for example, accounting,
maintenance, repair, janitorial and legal services! are currently performed in what
is labelled the service sector.1 These developments result in drastic changes of
the internal organization of the firm and can thereby potentially influence both
the firm’s performance and the macroeconomic performance of an economy. This
latter issue has received relatively little attention in the literature and will be the
focus of this paper.
Abraham and Taylor ~1993! distinguish three major factors that increase the
likelihood of outsourcing, which they all find to be empirically relevant on the
basis of establishment level data. First, outsourcing enables firms to save on wage
and benefit payments. These savings can be achieved if activities can be con-
tracted out to firms that offer less generous wages ~see also Feenstra and Hanson
~1995! for such an argument in an international context!. Second, by outsourcing
firms can transfer demand uncertainty to the outside contractor. This incentive
can be relevant given the willingness of firms to smooth the work load of their
regular work force. Required for profitability of outsourcing then is that the con-
tractor supplies to firms that are ~somewhat! unevenly hit by negative demand
shocks. Finally, outsourcing may yield firms access to specialized skills and in-
puts that the firm cannot afford itself. This reason is especially relevant when
economies of scale are involved in the supply of these production factors.
Along with the previously described benefits of outsourcing, there are also
costs involved which are emphasised in the transaction cost literature. In this lit-
erature, a microanalytic approach is taken to the study of economic organization,
with a focus on transaction costs and the efforts of organizations to economize
on these ~Williamson ~1985!, ~1998!!. From this perspective, outsourcing can be
seen as a reorganizational effort aimed at reducing transaction costs, taking into
account the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task comple-
tion under alternative governance structures. The principal factor to which appeal
is made is asset specificity. The argument runs as follows. With low asset speci-
ficity, the governance cost of mediation by the market is low relative to that of
in-house provision. ~As there is a low degree of bilateral dependency when asset
1 Francois and Reinert ~1995! find some empirical evidence for this phenomenon, although they
emphasize the importance of simultaneously considering changes in the structure of production for
understanding the rise of the service sector. To the extent that ‘splintering’ is relevant, deindustrial-
ization ~defined as a decline in manufacturing employment! should not be seen as a real phenomenon
but as resulting from measurement problems. In addition, this development puts popular statements
that most new employment is generated by small service sector specialists in perspective, to the ex-
tent that this employment has simply been transferred from ~large! goods-producing firms to the ser-
vice sector ~Postner ~1990!!. An interesting theoretical and empirical account of the consequences of
outsourcing for the development of the sectoral composition of economies ~in particular, the rise of
service sector employment! and differential productivity growth between service and manufacturing
productivity is given in Fixler and Siegel ~1999!.
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specificity is limited, and the market restrains bureaucratic distortions more ef-
fectively, market mediation is relatively advantageous; see Williamson ~1985! for
an extensive justification of this argument.! Furthermore, the economies of scale
to be gained by a single supplier operating in the market are potentially large.
For these reasons, vertical integration is unlikely to be profitable with low asset
specificity. However, as asset specificity increases, the bureaucratic costs of inter-
nal governance decrease relative to those of market mediation due to increased
bilateral dependency, increased costs of control, and the need to sign detailed con-
tracts that have limited adaptability. In addition, the benefits to be gained from
economies of scale decrease as assets become more specific to the firm in ques-
tion. Finally, high market power of the supplier of the specialized asset may re-
sult in a relatively high price for the asset. As a consequence, internal gover-
nance becomes more and more attractive when asset specificity increases. It
ultimately becomes the preferred mode of governance, resulting in vertical inte-
gration ~or ‘insourcing’ in the terminology of this paper!.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want to embed the previous infor-
mal arguments of the transaction cost literature in a formal dynamic general equi-
librium model. Second, we want to consider the macroeconomic consequences of
outsourcing for economic growth, product variety, and economic welfare. By
means of illustration, the model will be used to analyse the potential macroeco-
nomic consequences of the advent of Information and Communication Technol-
ogy ~ICT!. For this aim, we define outsourcing as vertical disintegration of pro-
duction ~i.e., buying indirect inputs on the market instead of producing them
internally!. The primary motive for outsourcing will be that it can give rise to the
exploitation of economies of scale present in the production of the indirect in-
puts. In empirical studies on outsourcing, cost savings resulting from the exploi-
tation of economies of scale or access to specialized inputs feature prominently
as one of the primary motivations for firms to engage in outsourcing ~e.g., Abra-
ham and Taylor ~1993!!. The model that we develop allows us to analyse under
what conditions outsourcing is a profitable strategy. Having established if, for
what reason, and under what conditions a firm engages in outsourcing, we ana-
lyse the macroeconomic consequences for the growth rate, product variety, and
economic welfare. We show that private profitability and social desirability of
outsourcing do not in general coincide; situations can arise in which outsourcing
occurs in a market economy at the expense of consumers’ welfare.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the model and its
solution. The welfare characteristics of the model are discussed in section 3. In
section 4, we illustrate the working of the model by studying the macroeconomic
consequences of declining transaction costs. This illustration is interesting in the
light of the advent of ICT. We also derive under what conditions the market equi-
librium of the model is socially optimal. Section 5 concludes.
55MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF OUTSOURCING
2 THE MODEL
The basic idea of the model that we develop is simple. We have a closed economy
with one final goods sector in which a variety of differentiated consumer goods
are produced. There is only one factor of production – labour – that is homo-
geneous and supplied inelastically. Consumers have a love for variety of con-
sumption goods. Each unique variety of the consumption good is produced by a
single producer. Producers compete monopolistically à la Chamberlin and in equi-
librium they earn zero ~excess! profits due to free entry and exit of firms. The
costs of producing the final consumption good consist of four parts, namely ~i!
direct wage costs resulting from the primary or core activities of the firm, ~ii!
indirect costs resulting from the support or non-core activities of the firm ~such
as accounting, cleaning, janitorial, maintenance and repair services!, ~iii! manage-
ment costs that have to be incurred before the firm is able to produce and ~iv!
the costs associated with the engagement in R&D activities. The support activi-
ties that form an input in the production process can be acquired in two ways.
Firms can produce them internally by employing labour or they can engage in
outsourcing, that is buying the good on the market. The decision whether or not
to engage in outsourcing and the macroeconomic consequences of this decision
are at the heart of the analysis in this paper. The management costs depend on
the mode of governance that firms adopt. That is, whether firms engage in out-
sourcing or whether they stick to the internal provision of the good or service in
question. This assumption is in line with the insights from the transaction cost
literature as it was discussed in the introduction. We return to the modelling of
management costs in section 4. The research that is performed by the firms re-
sults in increased total factor productivity ~TFP! and forms the ‘engine of growth’
in the model. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the model more
formally. Section 2.1 describes consumer behaviour, section 2.2 discusses pro-
ducer behaviour, and section 2.3 presents the equilibrium solution of the model.
We will compare the growth rates, firm size, and product variety in the two re-
spective regimes of internal provision and outsourcing of the support activity.
2.1 Consumer behaviour
Consumers maximize their intertemporal utility. They do so in two steps. In the
first step, the decision is made how much of the earnings are allocated to savings
and how much to consumption. In the second step, the income allocated to con-
sumption is divided over the varieties of the consumption good that are available.
More formally, in the first step a representative infinitely lived consumer maxi-
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mizes her intertemporal utility subject to a dynamic budget constraint:
max U 5 E
0
¥
Ct1 2 r
1 2 r
e 2 u t dt s.t. A~ t 5 rt At 1 wt Lt 1 pY 2 Ct PCt , ~1!
where C is a consumption index, 1/r is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
~which is assumed to be smaller than one!, u is the subjective discount rate, A is
wealth, r is the interest rate, w is the wage rate, pY are profits made in the sector
that potentially supplies the producers of the consumption goods with their sup-
port activities,2 and PC is the price index corresponding to the composite of con-
sumption goods. Standard dynamic optimization yields the familiar Ramsey rule
~a dot above a variable represents a derivative with respect to time, so
C~ t [ dC/dt!:
C~ t
Ct
5
rt 2 P~Ct /PCt 2 u
r
, ~2!
according to which consumers accept a steeper consumption profile the larger the
difference between the real interest rate ~r 2 P~C /PC! and the subjective discount
rate, and/or the larger the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The composite good C is composed of varieties of consumption goods ~in-
dexed i 5 1, ..., N with N being the number of varieties available on the market!.
We assume that consumers have a love for variety. In the second step of their
optimization, consumers maximize this consumption index subject to a static bud-
get constraint:
C 5 Ns F1N (i 5 1
N
ci
« 2 1
« G «« 2 1 s.t. (
i 5 1
N
ci pci # CPC , ~3!
where ci is the consumed quantity of the consumption good of variety i and « is
the elasticity of substitution between any pair of consumption goods. Consump-
tion goods of different types are imperfect substitutes ~« . 1!. The parameter s
captures the love for variety. This is – contrary to Dixit and Stiglitz ~1977! –
explicitly distinguished from the elasticity of substitution between any pair of con-
sumption goods. ~In the case considered by Dixit and Stiglitz, the parameter cap-
turing love for variety equals «/@« 2 1#!. We assume s to be larger than one. The
2 Profits in the consumption goods sector are ‘by definition’ equal to zero because of the free entry
and exit assumption, so we may omit these profits in the dynamic budget constraint. In the equilib-
rium in which the support activities are performed internally, the sector providing these activities is
not operating and hence pY 5 0.
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consumption index can then, under symmetry, be written as C 5 Ns21~Nc!. Un-
der the assumption of s . 1, consumers prefer of two equally sized bundles the
one with the greatest variety ~N!. As we show in sections 3 and 4, the distinction
between the elasticity of substitution and the love for variety is crucial for the
welfare results that we obtain ~see also Benassy ~1996!, Broer and Heijdra ~1996!
and de Groot and Nahuis ~1997!!. Optimization yields a standard downward-slop-
ing demand curve for consumption goods:
ci 5 1pci (i 5 1
N
ci
« 2 1
«
C 2
2 «
. ~4!
2.2 Producer behaviour
Each ~unique! variety of the consumption good is produced by a single firm. The
N firms that are operating in the economy aim at maximizing their present dis-
counted value by selling the unique brand of the consumption good that they
produce. The production process requires two ~direct! inputs, namely direct la-
bour ~Lci! and support activities ~yi!. Total factor productivity ~TFP! equals hi.
For simplicity, we assume that production takes place with a Leontief production
technology ~there are no substitution possibilities between the inputs!. We think
that this assumption of no ~or at least limited! substitution possibilities between
core and support activities matches reality quite well. The production function
can then be written as3:
ci 5 hi min FLci, yi
a
G . ~5!
3 A generalization of the model allows for a division of the support activity into M activities ~in-
dexed m 5 1, ..., M!, each with its own characteristics. An example of a generalization would be the
following production function:
ci 5 hi min FLci, Syi, m 2 fm
am
D 1gmG .
In this representation, a fixed amount of the support activity fm is required before the firm is able to
produce and we allow for the potential of decreasing or increasing requirements with scale ~gm smaller
or larger than one, respectively!. In the model in this paper, we use a specification characterized by
gm 5 1, M 5 1, and fm 5 0. This generalization would seriously complicate the analysis. However, it
is easily imagined that an equilibrium results in which a fraction of the support activities is out-
sourced, while another fraction is produced internally. Additionally, in such a setting the management
costs could be modelled as a ~declining! function of the fraction of support activities that has been
outsourced ~see Dluhosch ~1997! for a similar kind of modelling!.
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So the unit labour requirement equals 1/hi and the unit support activity require-
ment equals a/hi. Hence, the input ratio between ~direct! labour and support ac-
tivities is equal to 1/a.
Inspired by Smulders and Van de Klundert ~1995!, we assume that TFP has
important firm-specific or tacit elements. Firms can increase productivity by en-
gaging in R&D. The productivity of R&D labour increases with own knowledge
accumulated in the past:
h~i 5 jhi Lri , ~6!
where Lr is labour employed in R&D and j is the productivity parameter of do-
ing research. We deliberately simplify the analysis by assuming that knowledge
is completely internal to the firm. There are thus no externalities resulting from
interfirm knowledge spillovers. This simplification allows us to focus on the cru-
cial externalities in the context of the decision to engage in outsourcing ~see sec-
tions 3 and 4! without having to bother about the externality created by spill-
overs of knowledge between firms. Since the reproducible factor ~h! in the model
can be reproduced with constant returns to scale with respect to itself ~the core
property!, the model is characterized by endogenous growth.
Finally, each producer has to employ a fixed amount of management labour
~Lm! in each period before being able to produce. The cost of management is a
traditional fixed cost and will depend on the adopted mode of governance ~see
section 4!.
We can now turn to the optimization problem of the firm. This problem is
split in two steps. In the first step, the firm decides whether or not to engage in
outsourcing. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that in tak-
ing this decision firms only consider and compare the unit costs of the support
activity in case of internal provision and outsourcing, respectively. So in deciding
which mode of governance to adopt, firms do not take into account the conse-
quence of this choice for the management cost.4 As the unit cost of the support
activity in the regime in which firms engage in outsourcing can only be deter-
mined after solving the complete model, we can only turn to the outsourcing de-
cision after we have established the general equilibrium solution of the model.
This solution is presented in the next section. But before turning to this solution,
we need to analyse the second step of the firm’s optimization problem. After the
firm has decided about its mode of governance ~which is indexed by j, equalling
I when the firm provides the support activity internally and O when it engages in
4 This assumption is relaxed in De Groot ~1998! where the model is solved in case producers of the
consumption goods do take into account the consequences of their decision to engage in outsourcing
for the management cost. The basic results we derive in this paper are not altered by relaxing this
assumption, but the analysis becomes more complicated.
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outsourcing!, it maximizes its present discounted value:
max
Lci
j
, L
ri
j E
0
¥
@ci
j pcij 2 ~Lcij 1 Lrij 1 Lmj !w 2 yij pYj#e2rt dt , ~7!
subject to equations ~4!, ~5!, and ~6!. In this specification, pY is the cost of the
support activity ~which is produced internally or bought on the market!. Standard
dynamic optimization of the current-value Hamiltonian yields three first-order
conditions. The first says that firms put a mark-up of «/~« 2 1! on unit costs
~@w1apY#/h!:
›H
›ci
j 5 pci
j S1 2 1«D2 w 1 apY
j
hij
5 0 Û pcij 5
«
« 2 1
w 1 apYj
hij
. ~8!
The second indicates that firms change the number of R&D workers until the
marginal benefit of the last worker ~jphh! equals its marginal cost ~w!, where ph
is the shadow price corresponding to knowledge:
›H
›Lrij
5 phij jhij 2 w 5 0 Û pmj jhij 5 w . ~9!
Finally, there is a no-arbitrage condition stating that investing an amount ph in
the financial market at rate r should yield the same return as investing in knowl-
edge capital, which yields a capital gain, an increase in production, and an in-
crease in the knowledge base:
›H
dhij
5 pcij Lcij S1 2 1«D1 phij jLrij 5 r jphij 2 p˙hij Û
r 5
p˙hij
phij
1 Lcij
pcij
phij
« 2 1
«
1 jLrij . ~10!
In the remainder, we omit the governance index j where it leads to no confusion.
2.3 Solution of the model
In the previous sections we discussed consumer behaviour and producer behav-
iour that applies after producers have decided whether or not to engage in out-
sourcing. This decision depends on the characteristics of the general equilibrium
solution of the model that we discuss in this section. First, we describe in section
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2.3.1 the equilibrium that results if firms would decide to produce the support
activity internally. In section 2.3.2, the equilibrium with outsourcing is described.
Section 2.3.3 compares both equilibria and discusses which equilibrium prevails
in the market economy.
2.3.1 Equilibrium with internal provision of the support activities
In the equilibrium with internal provision of the support activity ~yi! this activity
is produced with labour ~Lyi! according to a constant returns to scale technology:
yi 5 Lyi . ~11!
The cost of one unit of the support activity thus equals w. The model is closed
by imposing a zero-profit condition, stating that entry or exit occurs until profits
in the consumption goods sector equal zero:
ci pci 5 ~Lci 1 Lyi 1 Lri 1 LmI !w , ~12!
and by imposing a labour market constraint:
L 5 (
i 5 1
N
~Lci 1 Lyi 1 Lri 1 LmI ! , ~13!
where L is exogenous labour supply. Assuming symmetry between firms, we can
drop firm indices and solve for the steady state of the model, taking the wage
rate as numeraire ~w 5 1!. This yields the steady-state growth rate ~see Appendix
A!:
gI [
h~I
hI
5
j ~« 2 1!
r 2 « FLmI 2 uj ~« 2 1!G , ~14!
and the equilibrium number of firms and the number of production workers ~see
Appendix A!5:
NI 5
Lj~r 2 «!
@j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u# «
and LcI 5
~« 2 1! @j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u#
j~r 2 «! ~1 1 a!
. ~15!
An important notion that will recur in the analysis is that the growth rate de-
pends positively on the management costs, and that the equilibrium number of
firms depends negatively on these management costs. As management costs in-
5 Stability of the equilibrium with a positive growth rate requires the following restriction on the
parameters: ~r 2 1! . ~« 2 1! . u/jLmI .
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crease, there is less room for firms with non-negative profits ~the equilibrium
number of firms declines!. As a consequence, each remaining individual firm be-
comes larger in size and its market share increases. This increased market share
increases the incentive for firms to engage in R&D, as each firm can now spread
its ~quasi! fixed R&D cost over a larger output. The growth rate will conse-
quently increase, reflecting the Schumpeterian character of the model.6 Another
characteristic of the equilibrium is that the macroeconomic production of non-
core activities ~NIaLcI 5 ~« 2 1!aL/@«~1 1 a!#! is independent of the management
cost. An increase in the management costs leads to an increase in firm size and
to an equi-proportionate decrease in the number of firms. The macroeconomic
demand for non-core activities is positively related to the mark-up. The explana-
tion for this is that a low mark-up leaves limited room for firms with non-nega-
tive profits. The macroeconomic employment of management labour ~NILmI ! con-
sequently goes down, leaving more room for productive activities.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with outsourcing of the support activities
In the equilibrium with outsourcing, a monopolist with access to a superior fixed-
cost technology can produce the support activities according to:
Y 5 d~LY 2 F! , ~16!
where Y is production of non-core activities, LY is labour employed by the mo-
nopolist, d is the marginal productivity of labour, and F is a fixed cost expressed
in units of labour. In a symmetric equilibrium, the output of the monopolist ~Y!
equals the demand from the producers of the consumption goods ~Nyi!. The su-
periority of the production technology is reflected in the assumption we make
that d . 1. The fixed cost can be seen in part as a cost that has to be incurred in
each period by the monopolist to establish and maintain a relationship with its
customers ~the users of the non-core activities!7 and in part as the cost of acquir-
ing and using the superior technology. Crucial is that the production technology
of the monopolist is characterized by increasing returns to scale. As discussed in
the introduction, exploiting economies of scale is an important motivation for out-
sourcing.
For outsourcing to take place, it has to be beneficial for both the monopolist
and the producers of consumption goods. This means that the price of the non-
6 Clearly, there are other insights in the literature on the effects of competition, possibly even caused
by increased outsourcing, that predict a positive relationship between competition and growth and
which are also associated with the work of Schumpeter. A discussion on this debate is beyond the
scope of this paper. We refer to, for example, Agion and Howitt ~1998! for a discussion on this issue.
7 See, for example, Kelley ~1997! for a model in which the monopolist can explicitly invest in
establishing a relation with customers and thereby enlarge the market it can supply. Similar consid-
erations could be built in our model, but would significantly complicate the analysis without adding
to the basic insights.
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core activity should be sufficiently low in order to trigger the producer of the
consumption goods to shift from internal production to outsourcing, while it
should be sufficiently high to enable the monopolist to earn a profit. These con-
ditions imply that the monopolist will engage in limit pricing,8 charging a price
for the support activity ~pY! that will be equal to w ~the unit cost of a support
activity if produced internally!. Pricing by the monopolist of the non-core activ-
ity slightly below this unit cost makes it profitable for the producer of the con-
sumption good to engage in outsourcing, and hence it will take the decision to
do so.9 So also in the regime with outsourcing, pY 5 w. As a result, the cost
structure in this regime is exactly the same as in the regime with internal provi-
sion. The model is again closed by imposing a zero-profit condition, stating that
entry or exit occurs as long as profits are unequal to zero:
ci pci 5 ~Lci 1 Lri 1 LmO!w 1 yi pY , ~17!
and by imposing a labour-market constraint:
L 5 (
i 5 1
N
~Lci 1 Lri 1 LmO! 1 LY . ~18!
The steady-state growth rate can now be obtained as ~see Appendix A!10:
gO 5
j ~« 2 1!
r 2 « FLmO 2 uj ~« 2 1!G . ~19!
The equilibrium number of firms and the equilibrium number of production work-
ers per firm equals ~see Appendix A!:
NO 5
~L 2 F!dj~r 2 «! ~1 1 apY!
@a~« 2 1 1 dpY! 1 d«# @j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
and
LcO 5
~« 2 1! @j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
j~r 2 «! ~1 1 apY!
. ~20!
8 We formally show in Appendix A that it is optimal for the monopolist to charge as high a price as
possible, and thus to engage in limit pricing.
9 Of course, there are more considerations to this decision not taken into account in this model for
reasons of simplicity, like considerations of increased uncertainty or reduced quality of the non-core
activities once a firm engages in outsourcing. Such extensions are interesting but beyond the scope of
this paper.
10 Stability of the equilibrium with a positive growth rate requires the following restriction on the
parameters: ~r 2 1! . ~« 2 1! . u/jLmO.
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Again, the macroeconomic demand for non-core activities ~NOaLCO! is not af-
fected by the management costs for the same reason as discussed in section 2.3.1.
The equilibrium number of firms now not only crucially depends on management
costs, but also on the superiority of the technology that the monopolist employs
to produce the support activity. The higher the productivity of the technology ~d!,
the lower the fixed cost ~F!, and the higher the intensity with which non-core
activities are used ~a!, the more firms can be sustained in equilibrium. As the
fixed cost technology improves, less labour is required to produce support activi-
ties leaving more labour for production of consumption goods resulting in larger
variety.
2.3.3 Comparison of the two regimes and equilibrium selection
In this section, we compare the macroeconomic characteristics of the two respec-
tive equilibria in terms of product variety, firm size, the production volume and
the growth rate. Next, we derive which equilibrium will prevail in the market
economy. Growth rates differ to the extent that there are differences in the man-
agement costs ~compare equations ~14! and ~19!!. If these costs are higher in the
regime with outsourcing, the room for firms with non-negative profits decreases,
the market shares of remaining firms increase, the incentive to engage in R&D
increases, and hence the growth rate will be higher ~and the other way around!.
Comparing product variety ~as measured by N; see equations ~15! and ~20!! in
the two equilibria boils down to:
NI . NO iff
L
@j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u#
.
~L 2 F! ~1 1 a!d«
@a~« 2 1 1 d! 1 d«# @j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
. ~21!
So the relative number of firms in the two regimes depends essentially on the
relative amount of management labour in the two equilibria and the superiority
of the fixed cost technology of the monopolist.11 The more management labour is
needed in the regime with internal provision relative to the regime with outsourc-
ing, the lower will be the relative number of firms in the regime with internal
provision. The more superior the fixed cost technology is, the higher the relative
number of firms in the regime with outsourcing.
Outsourcing will be a feasible strategy if profits for the monopolist supplying
the support activities are positive at the limit price ~pY 5 w!. Using equation ~20!
this condition boils down to:
11 Subtracting the solution for the number of firms under outsourcing ~equation ~20!! from the so-
lution for the number of firms under in-house provision ~equation ~15!!, and taking derivatives, it can
be verified that d~NI 2 NO!/dLmI , 0, d~NI 2 NO!/dLmO . 0, d~NI 2 NO!/dF . 0, d~NI 2 NO!/da , 0, and
d~NI 2 NO!/dd , 0.
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pY 5 pY NOyO 2 wLY 5 w FNOaLcOSd 2 1d D2 FG $ 0 Û
La~« 2 1! ~d 2 1! $ F«d~1 1 a! . ~22!
Producing NOyO internally would require NOaLcO units of labour. Outsourcing is
in other words feasible ~and will thus occur! if the labour requirement by the
monopolist ~LY! is smaller than the amount of labour required for the same pro-
duction volume under in-house provision. Note that the management requirement
does not enter in the condition for outsourcing to be profitable ~see equation ~22!!.
The reason is that an increase in the management cost leads to an equipropor-
tionate decrease in the firm size and thus leaves the macroeconomic demand for
non-core activities unaffected. Alternatively, we can show that the monopolist is
willing to supply the non-core activity ~i.e., pY . 0! in the specific case in which
the macroeconomic demand for non-core activities is larger in the regime with
outsourcing than in the regime with internal provision, which boils down to12:
NO 5
NIaLcI
aLcO
5
jL~r 2 «!
«@j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
. ~23!
We can interpret this condition as the minimum number of firms that has to be
sustained for outsourcing to be a profitable strategy for the monopolist ~given the
limit price he can maximally charge!. Results with respect to the likelihood of
the occurrence of outsourcing are summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Outsourcing is more likely to occur the larger the scale of
the economy ~L!, the lower the fixed cost of the superior technology ~F!, the
higher the productivity of the superior technology ~d!, the greater the de-
mand for the support activity ~a!, and the larger the elasticity of substitu-
tion ~«!; see equation ~22!.
So outsourcing will occur if the fixed cost technology is sufficiently superior, if
the scale of the economy is large so that the fixed cost of the superior technology
can easily be spread over a large output ~the degree of specialization is limited
by the size of the market!, and if consumption goods are close substitutes. This
last result can be understood, as close substitutability between consumption goods
implies strong competition between producers of consumption goods and a rela-
tively small number of firms. There will consequently be much labour left for
productive purposes as the amount of labour required for management activities
12 Using the solutions for N j and Lcj, we can derive a condition for which macroeconomic demand
is equal in the two regimes. This condition boils down to La~« 2 1! ~d 2 1! 5 F«d~1 1 a!. This con-
dition is equal to the condition pY 5 0.
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~NLm! is relatively small. The demand for support activities will consequently be
relatively large, and the profitability for the monopolist with access to the supe-
rior technology increases. Competition thus fosters outsourcing.13
3 OUTSOURCING AND WELFARE: GROWTH VERSUS PRODUCT VARIETY
Having established the two equilibria of the model as well as which equilibrium
will prevail in the market economy, we will now turn to the welfare characteris-
tics of the model by deriving and comparing welfare in the two respective re-
gimes. In order to make a welfare evaluation of the social desirability of out-
sourcing, we need to compare the present discounted utility of the representative
consumer in the two equilibria of the model. We recall from section 2.1 that the
present discounted utility equals
U0 5 E
0
¥
Ct12r
1 2 r
e2ut dt . ~24!
Substituting equation ~5! into equation ~3! and using the fact that the allocation
of labour and the growth rate are constant over time ~due to the absence of tran-
sitional dynamics!, we derive:
C 5 Nsci 5 Nsh0e gtLc , ~25!
where h0 is the initial productivity level at time t 5 0 ~which subsequently grows
at a constant rate g!. We can thus derive the present discounted value of utility
as:
U0 5 E
0
¥
@Nsh0 Lc#12r
1 2 r
e@~12r!g2u#t dt . ~26!
Integrating this expression finally yields:
U0 5
21
~r 2 1! @g~r 2 1! 1 u# @Ns21h0~NLc!#r21
. ~27!
13 A similar result is derived in a trade model by Dluhosch ~1997!. Trade is argued to enhance
competition and thereby increase the scale of firms and increase the incentive to save on production
costs. This is shown to result in an increased slicing of the value chain and an increase in outsourc-
ing.
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The present discounted utility of consumers is essentially determined by three
factors. First, the growth rate has a positive effect on utility. Second, product va-
riety positively affects utility ~captured by the term Ns21!, which is due to the
variety effect in consumer preferences ~s . 1!. Finally, utility is positively af-
fected by the produced volume of consumption goods ~basically captured by
NLc!. Given our previous discussion of the characteristics of the model, it will be
evident that there are two trade-offs involved here. Research labour goes at the
expense of production labour, while product variety goes at the expense of both
growth and production volume.
To compare welfare under the two regimes, we look at the difference in utility
between the two regimes14:
sgn. ~UO 2 UI! 5
sgn. SFj~r 2 1!LmO 2 uj~r 2 1!LmI 2 uG
r
s~r 2 1! 2 1
2FL@a~« 2 1 1 d! 1 d«#~L 2 F! ~1 1 a!d« GD . ~28!
From this equation, we can derive proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Outsourcing is more likely to be socially beneficial the larger
the scale of the economy ~L!, the lower the fixed cost of the superior tech-
nology ~F!, the higher the productivity of the superior technology ~d!, the
greater the demand for the support activity ~a!, and the larger the elasticity
of substitution ~«!. Furthermore, outsourcing is more likely to be socially
desirable the higher ~lower! the relative management cost ~LmO/LmI ! provided
that s , ~ . !r/~r 2 1!; see comparative statics of equation ~32!.
So the desirability of outsourcing increases with the superiority of the fixed-cost
technology ~captured by parameters d, a, L, and F!. Also, a larger elasticity of
substitution increases the desirability of outsourcing, as close substitutability be-
tween consumption goods implies strong competition and a relatively small num-
ber of firms. There will consequently be much labour left for productive pur-
poses, as the amount of labour required for management activities ~NLm! is
relatively small. The demand for support activities will consequently be relatively
high, increasing the desirability of exploiting the economies of scale to be gained
14 Using equation ~27!, we derive
sgn. ~UO 2 UI! 5 sgn. S 21@gO~r 2 1! 1 u# @~NO!sLcO# r21 1 1@gI~r 2 1! 1 u# @~NI!sLcI# r21D .
Substituting the expressions for g j, N j, and Lcj from equations ~14!, ~15!, ~19!, and ~20! and rewriting
yields equation ~28!.
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by using the superior technology. The effect of the ~relative! management costs
in the respective modes of governance ~LmO/LmI ! on the desirability of outsourcing
depends on the strength of the love for variety ~s! relative to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution ~1/r!. To understand this, we have to keep in mind that
our model is characterized by a trade off between growth and product variety.
The economy is characterized by either a few large firms with large market shares
and huge incentives to engage in R&D, or by many small firms with small mar-
ket shares and limited incentives to perform R&D activities. We have seen in
section 2 that high management costs result in little product variety, large market
shares for firms, and an accordingly large incentive to engage in R&D. Now sup-
pose that the regime switch from internal provision to outsourcing is accompa-
nied by a decrease in management costs. Outsourcing will then be accompanied
by an increase in product variety and a decrease in the growth rate. The lower
the relative management cost ~LmO/LmI !, the stronger this effect will be. The desir-
ability of outsourcing will hence be positively affected by a decrease in relative
management costs if the love for variety is strong relative to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. If the love for variety is weak relative to the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, a decrease in the relative management cost will
decrease the likelihood that utility in the regime with outsourcing is larger than
in the regime with internal provision. In the intermediate case, where
s 5 r/~r 2 1!, the growth and variety effects on utility exactly cancel each other
out. The increased likelihood that outsourcing is socially desirable due to in-
creased growth is exactly offset by its decreased likelihood due to reduced vari-
ety. Relative utility is hence not affected by relative management costs in this
specific case.15
4 OUTSOURCING AND THE ADVENT OF ICT
The advent of ICT is generally argued to be an important driving force behind
the increased tendency to outsource non-core activities. Audretsch ~1995! argues
the introduction of computers to be an important factor for explaining the mas-
sive downsizing of companies in the early 1990s in both Germany and the USA.
First, it reduced the amount of labour needed to produce a certain amount of
goods. Second, it also reduced firm size because ‘...information technology al-
lows for closer relations with suppliers and customers, thus making it possible
for firms to narrow their focus and spin-off previously integrated activities. Thus,
while the trend towards downsizing was initially triggered by the need to reduce
costs, it also reflects the administrative impact of information and communication
technologies. Increased use of technologies, such as electronic mail, voice mail,
15 Mathematically, these results follow from considering the power in equation ~28!. If
s . r/~r 2 1!, this power is negative and hence d~UO 2 UI !/d~LmO/LmI ! , 0. If s 5 r/~r 2 1!, this power
is equal to zero and hence d~UO 2 UI !/d~LmO/LmI ! 5 0.
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and shared databases, has, over time, reduced the need for traditional middle man-
agement, whose role was to supervise others and to collect, analyse, evaluate,
and transmit information up, down, and across the organizational hierarchy.’
~p.27!.
In a somewhat broader context, Freeman and Soete ~1994! discuss the advent
of information and communication technology, which they argue to be a new
techno-economic paradigm. The pervasiveness of this new paradigm is argued to
extend beyond just a few products or industries, and to affect every industry, ev-
ery service, their interrelationships, and indeed the whole way of life of industrial
societies. One of their arguments is that: ‘Because of rapid, easy access to infor-
mation at all levels both vertically and horizontally, intermediate layers of man-
agement were often no longer necessary. The need for rapid response and greater
decentralisation of responsibility within the new production and management sys-
tems also intensified this pressure towards ‘downsizing’ by reducing the number
of middle managers. ... A similar trend was clearly evident in Europe in 1993-
1994.’ ~p.57!. Another development described by Freeman and Soete is the in-
creased importance and flourishing of small and medium sized enterprises.
Both examples suggest that the advent of ICT affects the economy in various
ways. If tends to reduce transaction and transportation costs and thereby fosters
the market-mediated exchange of goods and services. Furthermore, the increased
reliance on outsourcing enabled by ICT leads to internal reorganization, mainly
resulting in the lay-off of management labour. Following Williamson ~1985! we
may interpret these lay-offs in terms of the market giving high-powered incen-
tives and thus requiring little management to coordinate decisions. The internal
reorganization of firms in turn leads to the advent of many small-sized enter-
prises ~see also Gordon ~1996!!.
In the remainder of this section, we will, inspired by the before mentioned
examples, use the model developed in this paper to predict the possible conse-
quences of the advent of ICT for macroeconomic variables like growth, product
variety and welfare. We also discuss whether private profitability and social de-
sirability of outsourcing will ~always! coincide. For this goal, we will look at the
effects of a gradual decline in transaction costs for the desirability and profitabil-
ity of outsourcing. Consistent with the previously discussed evidence, we will in
the remainder assume that firms that rely on outsourcing need less management
labour than firms that provide support activities internally.16
We introduce transaction or transportation costs by splitting the parameter d
into two parts ~see equation ~16!!. One part reflects the purely technical produc-
tivity advantage of the monopolist ~d8 which is larger than one!. The other part
16 Note, however, as we discussed in the introduction, that the opposite case can also apply. The
costs of monitoring the delivery of support activities, making contracts, and finding suppliers can be
so high that the management costs increase when outsourcing occurs. In the analysis that follows, this
possibility is left open, but not discussed explicitly.
69MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF OUTSOURCING
reflects the fact that only a fraction ~1 2 t! of the produced amount of the support
activity can effectively be used by the producer of the consumption good. ~When
conceiving t as a pure transportation cost of the iceberg type, one can imagine
that a fraction t of the shipped production is ‘lost’ during transportation.! The
parameter d then equals ~1 2 t!d8. Declining transaction or transportation costs
associated with the advent of ICT are thus reflected in an increase in the param-
eter d. Furthermore, changes in transaction costs are also reflected in the differ-
ence in the management requirement in the two regimes and in the presence of a
fixed cost in the production technology of the monopolist with access to the su-
perior technology. However, the three parameters reflect different factors. The pa-
rameter t comes closest to a real transportation cost for which location is one of
the important considerations. Differences in management requirements Lm reflect
organizational consequences of the decision to start outsourcing. The fixed cost
requirement F should be conceived as the cost of acquiring the superior technol-
ogy and acquiring relations with potential customers ~e.g., Kelley ~1997!!.
To look at the effects of declining transaction costs in this model, we will rely
on a graphical method. As we are mainly interested in the effect on profitability
and social desirability of ~i! changing transaction costs as captured by the change
in d, and ~ii! changes in the management requirements of firms following a re-
gime shift, we construct a d 2 LmO/LmI diagram. In this diagram, we can construct
three loci representing combinations of parameters for which pY 5 0 ~the PP lo-
cus!, NI 5 NO ~the NN locus!, and UO 5 UI ~the DD locus!, respectively. These
loci are derived from equations ~21!, ~22!, and ~28!; see Appendix B. They are
depicted in Figures 1a–1c. The PP locus is vertical in the d 2 LmO/LmI diagram.
Irrespective of the management cost, there is exactly one value of d for which
the monopolist breaks even. At larger ~smaller! values of d, the monopolist makes
profits ~incures losses!. This result is caused by the fact that changes in manage-
ment costs resulting in changing firm sizes lead to equiproportionate ~and oppo-
site! changes in the number of firms. They consequently leave the macroeco-
nomic demand for non-core activities unaffected, which ultimately is the factor
determining the private profitability of outsourcing.
The NN locus is upward sloping. An increase in the relative management re-
quirement ~LmO/LmI ! decreases, ceteris paribus, the relative number of firms
~NO/NI!. To offset this decrease, the superiority of the fixed cost technology has
to increase ~that is, d has to increase!. To the right ~left! of the NN locus, NO is
larger ~smaller! than NI. With respect to the DD locus, we have to distinguish
three cases. For high values of the love for variety relative to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, the DD locus is upward-sloping ~Figure 1c!.17 To ex-
17 In the specific case considered by Dixit and Stiglitz ~i.e., s 5 «/~« 2 1!! we only need to con-
sider one case. As stability of the equilibria with positive growth rates requires r . «, it holds that
«/~« 2 1! . r/~r 2 1!. We are thus in the situation where the taste for diversity is strong relative to
the willingness to smooth the consumption profile. This situation is depicted in Figure 1c.
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Figure 1a – ~s 5 r/~r 2 1!!: A benchmark
Figure 1b – ~s , r/~r 2 1!!
Figure 1c – ~s . r/~r 2 1!!
71MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF OUTSOURCING
plain this, we look at a decline in d. This decline in d makes consumers, ceteris
paribus, worse off in the regime with outsourcing. To compensate them in utility
terms, NO/NI should increase relative to gO/gI. This follows from the fact that
consumers have a strong love for variety relative to their willingness to substitute
intertemporally ~and thus to ‘accept’ a high growth rate!. This change will come
about, ceteris paribus, if the relative management costs ~LmO/LmI ! decrease ~see
section 2.2.3!. Similarly, the DD locus is downward sloping when the love for
variety is small relative to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ~Figure 1b!.
In the intermediate case where s 5 r/~r 2 1! the DD locus is vertical ~Figure 1a!.
This results from the fact that, ceteris paribus, a change in relative management
cost leaves relative utility unaffected, as explained in section 3.1. To the right of
the DD locus, at relatively high values of d, outsourcing is the socially preferred
mode of governance, while at low values of d internal provision is preferred.
We are now able to consider whether private profitability and social desirabil-
ity coincide. The results are described in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Consider the case of continuously declining transaction costs.
When s 5 r/~r 2 1! and/or LmO 5 LmI , social and private desirability of out-
sourcing coincide. When LmO , ~ . !LmI and s , r/~r 2 1!, outsourcing will
occur too quickly ~late! in the market from a social point of view. Con-
versely, when LmO , ~ . !LmI and s . r/~r 2 1!, outsourcing will occur too
late ~quickly! in the market from a social point of view.
This is further illustrated in Figures 1a-1c. In the case in which LmO 5 LmI ~the
horizontal line in Figure 1a-1c on which LmO/LmI 5 1!, outsourcing leaves the
growth rate unaffected. Outsourcing will hence be desirable if the equilibrium
with outsourcing can sustain more firms. This will exactly be the case if out-
sourcing is a profitable strategy. In the case in which s 5 r/~r 2 1!, the partial
effects on relative utility of a change in the relative management costs exactly
cancel each other out ~Figure 1a!. Hence outsourcing will be socially desirable if
it is privately profitable. The externalities resulting from changing growth and
interest rates due to a shift from in-house provision to outsourcing exactly cancel
each other out in this case. The market thus reflects the socially desirable trade-
off to be made in deciding whether or not to engage in outsourcing. Clearly, this
is only a knife-edge case of the model.
In general, social desirability and private profitability do not coincide. Let us
consider the case where love for variety is relatively small and management costs
are higher under in-house provision than with outsourcing ~Figure 1b!. It then
holds that the growth rate is smaller under outsourcing than under internal pro-
vision of non-core activities. In the initial situation ~point s! with relatively high
transaction costs, firms provide their support activities internally, which is also
the socially preferred mode of governance. As transaction costs decrease, the prof-
itability of the monopolist with access to the superior technology increases until
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it can just break even ~point p!. At that point, the monopolist will start producing
support activities and outsourcing will take place. Due to the lower management
costs in the regime with outsourcing, this shift in the mode of governance will be
accompanied by a decrease in the growth rate and an increase in the number of
firms. These effects are not taken into account by the monopolist, and from a
social point of view there is excess entry. In region IV, outsourcing is socially
undesirable. The market puts insufficient weight on the negative consequences
for consumers’ utility of the drop in the growth rate in making its decision to
engage in outsourcing. As consumers have a relatively limited love for variety,
the increase in product diversity is insufficient compensation for the drop in the
growth rate. As the decline in transaction costs continues and product variety in-
creases to a sufficiently large extent ~in region I!, outsourcing ultimately also be-
comes the socially preferred mode of governance ~at point d!.
Figure 1c describes the mirror image of Figure 1b. As transaction costs drop,
a region is passed ~region III! in which outsourcing does not take place though it
would be socially desirable. At point d, consumers would prefer the switch to a
regime of outsourcing and the accompanying increase in product variety at the
expense of a somewhat lower growth rate ~given their relatively strong love for
variety!. At this point, the demand for support activities is however not yet suf-
ficient to make the use of the fixed cost technology profitable for the monopolist.
To put it differently, in region IV, the monopolist is not sufficiently rewarded from
a social point of view for its decision to start producing and selling non-core
activities, and thereby, unintentionally, increasing product variety.
To conclude, ~exogenously! declining transaction costs will ultimately ~endog-
enously! result in outsourcing of support activities. This will affect firm size in
two ways. There is a direct effect as goods initially produced internally are now
bought on the market ~the ‘splintering’ effect referred to in the introduction!. The
indirect effect results from internal reorganization of the firm. More specifically,
we assumed that firms engaging in outsourcing require less management labour
than firms engaging in self-provision. The consequences of these changes for firm
size, number of firms and the attractiveness to outsource that are predicted by the
model are in accordance with the developments discussed in the beginning of
this section. Results peculiar to our specific model are the derived welfare con-
sequences and the prediction that the lay-off of management labour ~downsizing!
will result in lower incentives to engage in R&D and a subsequent decline in the
growth rate. This basically reflects the ‘Schumpeterian’ character of the model.
There is much debate in the literature as to whether this result will hold in real-
ity. Some economists ~e.g., Eliasson ~1992!! have argued that large firms are of-
ten unable to cope with the speed of change that is required in periods of tech-
nological and organizational turbulence. Pavitt ~1986! on the other hand has
argued that even very large firms are capable of learning and changing and that
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they have great advantages to exploit all kinds of economies of scale, present in
for example research and development.18
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has embedded arguments in the transaction cost literature as to why it
may be optimal for firms to engage in outsourcing in a dynamic general equilib-
rium model. This model was subsequently deployed to study the macroeconomic
consequences of outsourcing. More specifically, we established conditions under
which outsourcing will be a privately profitable strategy. Next, we studied the
macroeconomic consequences of outsourcing for economic growth, product vari-
ety, firm size, and welfare. It was shown that the private profitability and social
desirability of outsourcing do not coincide in general. This is caused by the fact
that firms do not take into account the consequences for product variety and mar-
ket shares of their decision to engage in outsourcing.
A result derived from the model is that declining transaction costs are a cru-
cial driving force behind outsourcing. We discussed the advent of information
and communication technology. This development was shown to be potentially
important in explaining the increase in outsourcing and downsizing of firms wit-
nessed in recent years. The model predicts that these trends will be associated
with an increase in product variety and a decrease in the macroeconomic growth
rate. The first prediction seems to be confirmed by the available evidence. The
second prediction relies crucially on the ‘Schumpeterian’ character of the model,
implying that large market shares are conducive to R&D and economic growth.
Finally, increased product market competition was shown to foster the incentive
to engage in outsourcing. We are ultimately left with the conclusion that the de-
cision to engage in outsourcing by private firms can have important macroeco-
nomic consequences. This conclusion has so far been underestimated in both the
theoretical and the empirical literature on outsourcing. Acknowledging this con-
clusion may, at least partly, enhance our understanding of the recent productivity
slowdown, of deindustrialization, and the advent of many small firms supplying
highly specialized inputs.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we will solve for the equilibrium growth rate, number of firms,
and allocation of labour under alternative modes of governance ~ j 5 I, O! and
under the assumption of symmetry. In the symmetric steady state, it holds by
18 Some other studies in favour of this line of argument mentioned in Freeman and Soete ~1994!
are Simonetti ~1993! and Lovio ~1994!.
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definition that:
g j [
h~ j
h j
5
c˙ j
c j
5
C~ j
C j
. ~A.1!
In addition, using the first-order conditions for firm behaviour ~~8! and ~9!!, we
can derive ~note that w [ 1!:
p˙hj
phj
5 2g j 5
p˙cj
pcj
5
P~Cj
PCj
. ~A.2!
For the regime with internal provision, we can thus write the no-arbitrage con-
dition as:
r I 1 gI 5 j~1 1 a!LcI 1 jLrI Û LcI 5
r I
j~1 1 a!
. ~A.3!
Substituting equation ~5! and ~8! into the zero profit condition ~12!, we get:
«
« 2 1
5 1 1
LrI 1 LmI
~1 1 a!LcI
Û ~1 1 a!LcI 5 ~« 2 1! SgIj 1 LmI D . ~A.4!
Combining ~A.3! and ~A.4!, we derive:
r I 5 ~« 2 1!gI 1 j~« 2 1!LmI . ~A.5!
Using ~A.1! and ~A.2!, we can write the Ramsey rule ~equation ~2!! as:
rg j 5 r j 1 g j 2 u Û r j 5 ~r 2 1!g j 1 u . ~A.6!
Confronting the planned growth rate ~A.5! with the Ramsey rule ~A.6!, we solve
for the equilibrium interest rate and the growth rate:
r I 5
« 2 1
r 2 «
@j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u# and gI 5
j~« 2 1!
r 2 « FLmI 2 uj~« 2 1!G , ~A.7!
where stability of the equilibrium with a positive growth rate requires
~r 2 1! . ~« 2 1! . u/jLm. Substituting the solution for the interest rate into ~A.3!
yields the equilibrium number of production workers per firm in the consumption
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goods sector:
LcI 5
~« 2 1! @j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u#
~r 2 «!j~1 1 a!
. ~A.8!
Finally, substituting the solutions for Lc and Lr~ 5 g/j! into the labour market
constraint ~13!, and using ~5! and ~11!, we can solve for the equilibrium number
of firms:
NI 5
Lj~r 2 «!
@j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u#«
. ~A.9!
The solution procedure for the growth and interest rates and the equilibrium num-
ber of firms under the regime with outsourcing is similar to the procedure for the
regime with internal provision, and follows using equations ~8!–~10! and ~16!–
~18!. Using equations ~A.1! and ~A.2!, we can write the no-arbitrage condition
~10! as:
rO 1 gO 5 j~1 1 apY!LcO 1 jLrO Û LcO 5
rO
j~1 1 apY!
. ~A.10!
Substituting equations ~5! and ~8! into the zero-profit condition ~17!, we get:
«
« 2 1
5 1 1
LrO 1 LmO
~1 1 apY!LcO
Û ~1 1 apY!LcO 5 ~« 2 1! SgOj 1 LmOD . ~A.11!
Combining ~A.10! and ~A.11!, we derive:
rO 5 ~« 2 1!gO 1 j~« 2 1!LmO . ~A.12!
Confronting the planned growth rate ~A.12! with the Ramsey rule ~A.6!, we solve
for the equilibrium interest and growth rates:
rO 5
« 2 1
r 2 «
@j ~r 2 1!LmO 2 u# and
gO 5
j~« 2 1!
r 2 « FLmO 2 uj~« 2 1!G , ~A.13!
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where stability of the equilibrium with a positive growth rate requires the param-
eter restriction ~r 2 1! . ~« 2 1! . u/jLm. We can now derive the number of pro-
duction workers and the firm size, using ~A.10!, Lr 5 g/j, and ~A.13!, as:
LcO 5
~« 2 1! @j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
j~r 2 «! ~1 1 apY!
,
LcO 1 LrO 1 LmO 5
@j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u# ~« 1 apY!
j~r 2 «! ~1 1 apY!
. ~A.14!
Using ~5!, ~16!, ~18!, and ~A.14!, we can solve for the number of firms:
NO 5
~L 2 F!dj~r 2 «! ~1 1 apY!
@a~« 2 1 1 dpY! 1 d«# @j~r 2 1!LmO 2 u#
. ~A.15!
We can now determine the optimal price to be set by the monopolist providing
support activities. Substituting the solutions for N and Lc into the profit function
for the monopolist, we get:
pY 5 YpY 2 wLY 5 NOaLcO SdpY 2 wd D2 wF
5
a~L 2 F! ~« 2 1! ~dpY 2 w!
a~« 2 1 1 dpY! 1 «d
2 wF . ~A.16!
From this expression, it is easily derived that ›pY/›pY . 0. Thus the monopolist
will set as high a price as possible ~that is, the monopolist will engage in limit
pricing: pY 5 w [ 1!.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we will derive mathematically the equations underlying Figures
1a–1c. Using equation ~21! ~with equality!, we derive that the number of firms is
equal if
LmO 5
1
j~r 2 1! F~j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u! F ~L 2 F! ~1 1 a!d«L@a~« 2 1 1 d! 1 «d#G1 uG .
~NN-locus!
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Using equation ~22!, it follows that profits for the monopolist equal zero at:
d 5 d* [
aL~« 2 1!
aL~« 2 1! 2 F«~1 1 a!
. ~PP-locus!
For larger ~smaller! values of d, the use of the superior technology is ~un-!prof-
itable.
Similarly, we derive from equation ~28!, that social indifference occurs at:
LmO 5
1
j~r 2 1! F~j~r 2 1!LmI 2 u! F ~L 2 F! ~1 1 a!d«L@a~« 2 1 1 d! 1 d«#G
s~r21!
s~r21!2r
1 uG .
~DD-locus!
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to d, it follows that the DD
locus is upward-~downward-! sloping if s . ~ , !r/~r 2 1!, and vertical at
s 5 r/~r 2 1!.
Now several points with respect to the relative position of the three loci need
to be mentioned. First, the three loci will always intersect at the point where
d 5 d* and LmO 5 LmI . Secondly, the DD locus will be vertical and coincide with
the PP locus at s 5 r/~r 2 1!. Thirdly, the NN locus and the DD locus will co-
incide when r 5 0. Since stability with positive growth rates requires r to be
larger than 1, this coincidence will not occur. Finally, when s . r/~r 2 1! and the
DD locus is thus upward sloping, its slope is larger than the slope of the NN
locus ~since s~r 2 1!/@s~r 2 1! 2 r# . 1!.
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